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Basic Righis for Juveniles in Juvenile Proceedings
Under the Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules:
A Response to Gault
Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not
justify a kangaroo court.
-Mr. Justice Fortas in In re Gault
387 U.S. 1 (1967)
The development of juvenile courts in the United States is
based upon the recognition that a child who violates the law
ought not be subjected to adult criminal proceedings and adult
criminal penalties.' Juvenile statutes in the past sought to pro-
vide "treatment" for the child rather than punishment 2 under
the concept of parens patriae.3 Moreover, most statutes classi-
fied the juvenile proceeding as "civil" rather than "criminal" in
an effort to remove the stigma associated with "criminal" acts.
4
1. The nation's first juvenile court act was passed in Illinois in
1899. ILL. LAws, 41st Gen. Ass. 1899, The Treatment and Control of De-
pendent, Neglected, and Delinquent Children § 21 at 137:
The care, custody, and discipline of a child [found to be delin-
quent, dependent or neglected] shall approximate as nearly as
may be that which should be given by its parents.
2. See, e.g., Juvenile Court Act of 1959, AmN. STAT. § 260.011
(2) (1967):
The purpose of the laws relating to juvenile courts is to secure
for each minor under the jurisdiction of the court the care and
guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the spirit-
ual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and
the best interests of the state; to preserve and strengthen the
minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from the
custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety and pro-
tection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without
removal; and, when the minor is removed from his own family,
to secure for him custody, care and discipline as nearly as pos-
sible equivalent to that which should have been given by his
parents.
3. Under this concept the state is permitted to assume the position
of the parent and act in his stead to secure the welfare of a minor. E.g.,
Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 83, 121 A. 678, 682-83 (1923); Common-
wealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905). The leading article in
the development of this concept and the idea that a child ought to be
cared for rather than punished is Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 lHnv. L.
REv. 104 (1909).
4. MI N. STAT. § 260.211(1) (1967):
[N]or shall any child be deemed a criminal by reason of this
adjudication, nor shall this adjudication be deemed a conviction
of crime.
This distinction has also been made by numerous courts in dealing with
juveniles. E.g., State ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82
N.W.2d 234 (1957); Shioutakon v. D.C., 98 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 236 F.2d
666 (1956); Thomas v. United States, 74 U.S. App. D.C. 167, 121 F.2d 905
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These developments were followed by a movement away from a
formalized court procedure in juvenile court which was thought
to be detrimental to the child.5
The practical result of these "protective" measures was an
effective denial of the juvenile's procedural rights.6 Since the
"treatment" received by the child was often similar in effect to
that of convicted criminals, the denial of traditional due process
came to be sharply criticized as a legal fiction.7 The United
States Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault8 is the culmina-
tion of a growing recognition 9 that parens patriae has failed to
achieve its objectives 0 and that a juvenile hearing which could
result in commitment, loss of personal freedom and disruption
of the family relationship is clearly more criminal than civil
in nature."
Specifically, Gault held that notice of charges, right to coun-
sel, right of confrontation and cross-examination and the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination are to be extended to the adju-
dicatory phase of delinquency proceedings where an adjudica-
tion of delinquency carries with it the possible consequence of
commitment to a state institution.1 2  Thus, due process pre-
viously granted to adults in criminal proceedings was made
available to juveniles in state juvenile proceedings.
(1941); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932); Peterson v.
McAuliffe, 151 Minn. 467, 187 N.W. 226 (1922); Robinson v. Wayne Cir.
Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682 (1908); Commonwealth v. Fisher,
213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905).
5. It was thought that formalized procedure would render thejuvenile statute nugatory and deprive it of the greater part of its
benevolent purposes. In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 P. 563 (1908).
6. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967). Prior to Gault, constitu-
tional due process was traditionally held not applicable to juvenile
proceedings. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (1959); Shioutakon v.
D.C., 98 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 236 F.2d 666 (1956); Thomas v. United
States, 74 U.S. App. D.C. 167, 121 F.2d 905 (1941); Cinque v. Boyd, 99
Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A.
198 (1905).
7. Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and
Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 791 (1966); Paulsen, Fair-
ness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MIN. L. REv. 547, 550 (1957).
8. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
9. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
10. Judge Ketcham of the Washington, D.C. Juvenile Court noted
the failure of juvenile courts under parens patriae in Ketcham, The
Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME Am DELwIQ. 97
(1961) and argued that "the state has no right to substitute govern-
mental for parental neglect." Id. at 101.
11. 387 U.S. at 23-24, 36-37.
12. Id. at 13, 30.
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As the result of a re-evaluation of juvenile procedure
brought about by Gault, several attempts, either by promulga-
tion of court rules or by statute, to extend due process to ju-
veniles have been undertaken in several states.'3 The Minnesota
Juvenile Court Rules 4 stand as one of these attempts. With re-
spect to the grant of basic rights for juveniles, the Rules seem
to be the most comprehensive of these attempts to deal with the
problems of due process for juveniles in the aftermath of the
Gault decision.' 5
This Note will examine the Rules critically as a response to
Gault. Special consideration will be given to the basic rights
extended to the juvenile by these Rules, the problem of compli-
ance with these Rules in view of present court practice, and the
probable impact of the Rules on the form and substance of the
juvenile hearing once full compliance is achieved.
I. THE MINNESOTA JUVENILE COURT RULES
The Rules specifically provide for notice of charges,16 right
to counsel,' 7 right to confrontation and cross-examination, 8 and
the privilege against self-incrimination, 9 all of which are re-
quired by Gault, plus the right to a transcript of the proceed-
ings20 and the right to appellate review,2 ' which were discussed
but not passed on in Gault.22 The Rules also provide for the
power of subpoena2 3 and the right to enter evidence in one's own
behalf.24 To insure the protection of these rights, the Rules set
forth detailed requirements for (1) the giving of notice of basic
13. See icHIGAN JuvENILE COURT RULES (1969); NEW JERSEY
AND Do 1EsTic RELATIONS COURT RULES, PROCEDURE IN JUVENILE CAUSES,
rules 6:8-6:8.7 (1969); CALIF. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 627.5-707 (West
Supp. 1968); N.Y. FAmnIy COURT ACT (McKinney 1968).
14. RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS IN THE
AINESOTA PROBATE-JUVENILE COURTS (1969), as amended, (Supp. Sept.
1969) [hereinafter cited as MJCR].
15. In addition to the procedural rules promulgated since Gault
and noted supra note 13, see COUNCIL OF JUDGES, NAT'L COUNCIL ON
CRnvfE AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS (1969)
which provided much of the background for the drafting of the MJCR.
16. MJCR 3-2(1).
17. MJCR 2-1.
18. MJCR 2-3(1) (b) & (c).
19. MJCR 2-2.
20. MJCR 2-3(1) (d).
21. MJCR 2-3(1) (e).
22. 387 U.S. at 57-58.
23. MJCR 2-3(1) (f).
24. MJCR 2-3 (1) (a).
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rights at various stages of the juvenile proceeding, and (2) the
waiver of rights by the juvenile, which has not been dealt with
adequately by courts25 in the past although acknowledged as a
problem in Gault.28 In addition, forms are required to be used
in connection with notice of rights and other provisions of the
Rules to obtain compliance with individual rules and to achieve
the formalized procedure contemplated by the Rules.27
II. BACKGROUND OF MINNESOTA JUVENILE LAW
Prior to promulgation of the Rules, juvenile law in Minne-
sota was based on both statute and custom. The statutory re-
quirements are contained in the Minnesota Juvenile Court Act
of 1959,28 which in regard to prov.ding certain basic rights is
similar to juvenile acts recently adopted in other states .2  The
Act provides for the right to counsel, including the appointment
of counsel where the court finds tle.s "desirable,"30 and for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem where the parent or guard-
ian is found to be hostile to the interests of the child.31 A
recitation of the substance of the petition must be served with
the summons, 32 and notice of thepending cause is required to be
served upon the parents where they have not otherwise been
25. See discussion in Note, Waiver -in Juvenile Court, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 1149 (1968).
26. The Court acknowledged that a problem of waiver would exist
in the case of juvenile rights but set down no guidelines to be followed.
This caused Judge Ketcham to predict that this might prove to be the
"achilles heel" of the opinion. Ketcham, Guidelines From Gault: Revo-
lutionary Requirements and Reappraisal, 53 VA. L. REV. 1700 (1967).
27. Of the 87 counties in the State of Minnesota, the juvenile
court is a division of the probate court ir 85 while in the two metropoli-
tan counties-Hennepin and Ramsey-it is a division of the district
court. The difference in court structure is based on population-
200,000 or more persons places the county juvenile court within the dis-
trict court. MnN. STAT. § 260.021 (1957). Thus, the MJCR do not
apply to the two largest counties of the state where over 50 percent
of the juvenile hearings are conducted.
St. Louis County has a population in excess of 200,000 but juvenile
court jurisdiction was recently transferred to the probate court. Thus,
the Rules apply by virtue of the language contained in MJCR 1-2(d)
without further action.
28. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.011-.301 (1967).
29. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 22 (Supp. 1967); See ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 37 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969). See also NAT'L PROBATION AND
PAROLE Ass'N, STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT (1943).
30. Alum. STAT. § 260.155(2) (1967).
31. M nN. STAT. § 260.155(4) (1967).
32. Alu. STAT. § 260.135(1) (1967).
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summoned.33 At the hearing, any party to the juvenile cause3 4
may enter evidence, testify and cross-examine witnesses.3 5 Ap-
peal may be taken from an adjudication of delinquency.3 6 The
Juvenile Court Act specifies no formalized procedure for notifi-
cation of these rights, nor for conduct of the hearings. In fact,
the Act expressly provides that the hearing may be run in an in-
formal manner but does not specify what "informal" means.
37
Aside from the Juvenile Court Act, juvenile law in Minne-
sota prior to the Rules has been shaped primarily by custom,
which varies widely from county to county.3 8 The variance in
court procedure is due in part to the statutory provision for
appeal from the probate-juvenile court to the district court de
novo,3 9 which in effect makes the juvenile hearing records of
probate courts nonreviewable. As a result, such records have
been infrequently maintained.40  This practice impeded the de-
velopment of uniform procedure and consequently makes it dif-
ficult to draw conclusions on the procedure of juvenile courts in
Minnesota. A second factor contributing to the variance in pro-
cedure is the dearth of appellate court decisions 41 establishing
33. MINN. STAT. § 260.135(2) (1967).
34. A "juvenile court cause" is defined as,
any action over which the juvenile court has original and ex-
clusive jurisdiction ... except an adoption action and proceed-
ings for judicial consent to marriage.
MJCR 1-2(b). Under MINN. STAT. § 260.111 (1967), the juvenile court
has exclusive and original jurisdiction in the following proceedings:
delinquency, traffic offense, neglect, dependency, termination-of-pa-
rental-rights, appointment and removal of a guardian in termination,
judicial consent to marriage and adoption matters involving children.
35. MINN. STAT. § 260.155(6) (1967).
36. In those counties in which the juvenile court is a division of
the probate court, appeal is taken to the district court de novo whence
it may be appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court. MIN. STAT.
§ 260.291(2) (b) (1967). In the other counties, appeal is direct to
the Minnesota Supreme Court from the district-juvenile court. MnN.
STAT. § 260.291(2) (a) (1967).
37. MIN. STAT. § 260.155(1) (1967).
38. Interview with Judge Charles E. Cashman of the Juvenile
Court of Steele County and Chairman of the MJCR Committee, in
Owatonna, Minnesota, Feb. 11, 1969.
39. Id.
40. A substantial number of the probate-juvenile courts do not
make a verbatim record of the proceedings. MINNESOTA GOVERNOR'S
COMm'N ON LAw ENFORcEMENT, AD. OF JUSTICE AND CORRECTION, REPORT
OF COMM. ON AD. OF JUSTICE, SUBCOMM. ON JUVENILE PROCEDURES AND
FAcnirrES app. B at 2 (Jan. 1968) [hereinafter cited as JUVENIE SUB-
COMIITTEE REPORT).
41. The few appellate decisions that do exist deal with notice.
The leading case is State ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82
N.W.2d 234 (1957) (Notice requirement held to be jurisdictional in a
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procedural guidelines for juvenile courts to follow. Thus, the
absence of appellate precedent coupled with the absence of re-
view of probate-juvenile hearing proceedings left juvenile judges
free to develop their own procedural rules.
One of the greatest differences in procedure was found in
the area of notice of charges. The statute allows a minimum of
only 24 hours between the notice of charges and the adjudica-
tory hearing,42 but does not specifically require that this notice
contain a statement of facts in support of the allegation of de-
linquency.43 Thus, much was left to the discretion of each juve-
nile court. Courts in some counties held a preliminary hearing
similar to a criminal arraignment up to seven days before the
adjudicatory hearing44 for the sole purpose of advising the juve-
nile of his rights, the nature of the charges against him, the
facts supporting them and the possible consequences of the pro-
ceeding.45 More often no such amount of time was given, nor
was a statement of facts presented to the juvenile. As a result,
the practice in some counties of proceeding on the merits at the
initial hearing permitted little time for the preparation of the
juvenile's defense.
The form of notice of charges has varied as much as the
time permitted to prepare for a hearing. In the past, less than
half of the probate-juvenile courts served written notice on the
child as Gault seems to require.46 Virtually all courts advised
the juvenile and his parents of the right to counsel and the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, 47 but no reliable data
is available on the frequency of appointment of counsel.48 On
the other hand, just over half of the courts routinely advised the
juvenile of his right to remain silent. 9
hearing on reference for prosecution. Court order for reference is not
valid when notice is not effected prior to hearing and waiver cannot
be accomplished after hearing.)
42. MINN. STAT. § 260.141(1)(a) (1967).
43. MINN. STAT. § 260.131(3) (a) (1967) only requires the petition
to include "the facts which bring the child within the jurisdiction of the
court." It should be noted, however, that if the petition is not attached
to the summons or notice, even this provision of the statute would not
be operative for the purpose of giving the person some form of notice
of charges. Cf. Note, Reference for Prosecution. in. Juvenile Court Pro-
ceedings, 54 MINN. L. REV. 389 (1969).
44. JUVmE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 40, app. B at 1.
45. Interview, supra note 38.
46. J VENLE SU-CO-MATTEE REPORr, supra note 40, app. B at 1.
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 1-2.
49. Id. at 2.
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The role of officials in the juvenile process also varied widely
from county to county. In some counties, all juvenile proceed-
ings have been presided over by the juvenile judge.5 0 Other
counties have relied on probation officers as referees in all traffic
offender cases,5 ' which constitute the great bulk of juvenile cases
in those counties. The role of police officers varied from drafting
petitions in the larger counties, and extensive participation at in-
take in metropolitan areas to very little participation in the
rural counties. 2  It has been the practice in most counties to
have the county attorney present the state's evidence at the ad-
judicatory hearing,53 though this is not required by statute.54
Thus, since the structure and procedure of the juvenile court
process have evolved primarily from custom, it is difficult at
best to draw broad conclusions about juvenile law in Minnesota.
It is against this background of ollapodrida in structure and
procedure as well as against the requirements of Gault that this
examination of the Rules is made.
III. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF MJCR
While seeking to establish basic due process in the juvenile
court the Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules are not merely a pro
forma adoption of Gault. Though incorporating the specific
requirements set forth by Gault, the Rules also deal with prob-
lems discussed but not adjudicated in that case. Due process is
extended to the pre- and post-adjudicatory phases of delinquency
proceedings, and to the adjudicatory and dispositional phases of
dependency, neglect and termination-of-parental-rights hearings.
Thus, the Rules are more appropriately viewed as an attempt to
provide due process for juveniles using Gault only as a starting
point for that purpose.
50. This is true of the practice in Steele County. Interview,
supra note 38.
51. E.g., In Scott County the Chief Probation Officer sits as referee
in these cases.
52. Interview with J. Jerome Kuck, County Attorney, Dakota
County and President, Minnesota County Attorney's Association, in
Hastings, Minnesota, Feb. 19, 1969.
53. Interview, supra note 38. This is in marked contrast to the
practice reported in other states where the role of "prosecutor" is often
filled by the judge, referee or probation officer. See generally Note,
supra note 7.
54. Mumn. STAT. § 260.155(2) (1967) makes provision for the
county attorney to present evidence when requested to do so by the
court.
19691
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A. NOTICE OF CHARGES
The notice requirements of the Rules differ in many respects
from past practice in most Minnesota counties.55 Under the
Rules, the notice or summons to appear must be served together
with a copy of the petition"5 upon both the parent and the child
unless the child is under 14 years of age in which case it must
be served only upon the parent.57 The summons, and any initial
notice, must contain a statement describing the purpose and
possible consequences of the adjudicatory hearing and a state-
ment specifying and explaining the child's basic rights.58 Most
importantly, the Rules adopt the Gault requirements that the
notice to appear must contain a statement of facts, made with
"particularity,"r9 to support the caie on which the petition is
based, and that service must be made "sufficiently in advance"
of the proceeding to permit enough time for preparation of a
defense. Specifically, the Rules triple, to 72 hours, the statutory
minimum amount of time between notice and hearing.60 Thus,
by providing juvenile courts with a ciar, formalized technique
for giving notice of charges, the Rules fill an area left open by
Gault.
The Rules raise the obvious question of whether the practice
of immediate adjudication on the merits at the initial hearing
is now permissible. While this practice may not have provided
sufficient time to prepare a defense in the past,0 ' it could be
argued that the more specific notice of charges combined with
the extension of the minimum time under the Rules preclude
any denial of due process. It would seem, however, neither ex-
pedient nor necessary in the quest for due process to proceed on
the merits at the initial hearing. Rather, judges would be well
advised to use this hearing to inform all parties of their rights
55. See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra. The Juvenile Court
Act requires only a minimum of information set forth in the petition,
(Mm. STAT. § 260.131 (1967)), and only 24 hours notice before the hear-
ing. MnhN. STAT. § 260.141 (1) (a) (1967).
56. MJCR 4-2.
57. MJCR 4-6.
58. MJCR 4-2(b)- (d).
59. The MJCR require a citation of the law violated and a "clear
and particularized statement of facts" to support the allegation of de-
linquency. MJCR 3-2(1) (a) & (b). See also MJCR 4-2. This re-
quirement is mandatory in all other juvenile proceedings as well.
MJCR 3-3 (neglect); MJCR 3-4 (dependency); MJCR 3-5 (termination-
of-parental-rights).
60. MJCR 4-4.
61. See 387 U.S. at 33; Paulsen, Juvenile Courts and the Legacy of
'67, 43 IND. L.J. 527, 541 (1968).
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and the consequences of the proceeding, since written notice
alone may be inadequate to protect these rights. More impor-
tantly, the initial hearing should be used to determine the rela-
tionship between parent and child for the purpose of appointing
a guardian ad litem or separate counsel when necessary. 62
The Rules also require that all petitions, with the sole ex-
ception of the notice to appear on a traffic offense, must be
drawn by the county attorney.63 The degree to which this can
be expected to increase the county attorney's workload depends,
of course, upon current practices. In counties with large popu-
lations the juvenile department of the local police force often
drafts the petition," and in at least one county all petitions are
drafted by the office of the Director of Court Services.6 5 While
the validity of these practices is placed in question by a strict
reading of the Rules, in the larger counties where most of the
juvenile cases are heard such practices may actually be neces-
sary to comply with the requirement for more detail in the pe-
tition. Thus, so long as the petition is reviewed and signed by
the county attorney, such practices should not be held violative
of the Rules. In this event, any impact on the workload of the
county attorney's office as a result of the notice requirement is
not likely to be substantial except when taken together with
other requirements. 66
B. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
1. Nature of the Right Under the Rules
The Gault court declared that due process requires the right
to counsel and appointment of counsel where it can not be af-
forded, and notice of these rights for both the child and his par-
ents. The Court, however, limited its consideration to delin-
quency proceedings in which an adjudication can result in "com-
62. See text accompanying notes 77-79 infra.
63. MJCR 3-1(1) (a).
64. E.g., Dakota County. Interview, supra note 52.
65. Interview with Richard Mulcrone, Chief Probation Officer and
Director of Court Services, Scott County, in Shakopee, Minnesota,
Mar. 25, 1969.
66. E.g., The possible increase in representation by counsel, noted
at text accompanying note 91 infra, and the apparent requirement that
the county attorney appear at all hearings. The requirements of the
MJCR have already met strong criticism from the State County Attor-
ney's Association as being too burdensome in terms of time for the na-
tare of the juvenile case involved. On the other hand, there is no rea-
son not to require the state to make a clear showing of its case
merely because a juvenile is involved.
1969]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
mitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is cur-
tailed."67  This restriction is not surprising since the right to
counsel 68 is usually considered only in the context of the adju-
dicatory hearing.
The Rules' treatment of the right to counsel goes signif-
icantly further by granting the right to counsel at "any and all"
stages of a cause 69 under which the juvenile court has exclusive
and original jurisdiction, with the sole exception of adoption pro-
ceedings.7 0 Thus, the right arises in traffic offense, neglect, de-
pendency, and termination-of-parental-rights causes 71 and also
in the pre- and post-adjudication phases of delinquency proceed-
ings which were singled out as unique in Gault and therefore
not within the ambit of the Court's opinion.
72
2. Time at Which the Right Arises
While Gault makes no reference to the time at which the
right to counsel arises, the Rules clearly state that a child's
right to counsel, including the right to reasonable consultation
with his attorney while in custody, arises at "the moment he is
taken into custody by a representative of the state."73 A strict
reading of this provision, in connection with the rule prohibiting
interviewing the child in the absence of his parents, would re-
quire the appointment of an attorney for the child as soon as
67. 387 U.S. at 13.
68. For a discussion of the right tc counsel see Skoler, The Right
to Counsel and the Role of Counsel in Juvenile Court Proceedings, 43
IND. L.J. 558 (1968); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41
MfntN. L. REv. 547, 568-72 (1957); Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the
Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 585 (1965). Right to counsel is
often guaranteed by statute, e.g., CAM'. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 633
(West Supp. 1968); COLO. REV. STAT. Aim&. § 22-1-6 (Supp. 1967); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); N.Y. FAMmLY
COURT ACT § 741 (McKinney 1968).
It can hardly be maintained thai. the juvenile does not need
counsel when one considers his disability by virtue of his age and the
possible consequences of a delinquency hearing. See Note, supra note
25, at 1154, 1158; Skoler, id. at 572; Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-
Fundamental Fairness for the Accused in a Quasi-Criminal Forum, 50
ixxN. L. REV. 653, 694-96 (1966).
69. MJCR 2-1(1).
70. MJCR 1-2(2).
71. MINN. STAT. § 260.111 (1967) includes these causes in the ex-
clusive and original jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
72. 387 U.S. at 31 n.48.
73. MJCR 2-1 (1). This Rule does not specifically require that the
attorney be present during any interrogation of the child while in cus-
tody following notification of rights, but it does require the presence
of at least one parent.
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he is taken to the police station if his parents could not be
located to exercise waiver. Even if located, a court might find
the parents incapable of exercising a knowledgeable waiver of
the child's right to counsel. In such a case, the child could
be taken into custody and held without interview pending the
appointment and arrival of an attorney to represent him. This,
of course, raises the practical problem of whether counsel will
be readily available. In those counties with a limited number of
public defenders available, the Rules may be difficult to follow.7 4
3. Parent-Child Conflict of Interest
One of the most striking features of the Rules is the right
to separate counsel for both parent and child when their inter-
ests conflict.7 5 Since the juvenile court may appoint separate
counsel on its own initiative, without a formal request by the
parties, it is faced with a special responsibility to determine
whether such conflict does in fact exist. The right to such ap-
pointment exists in all instances where the right to counsel
arises. Due to the special importance of separate counsel in
neglect, dependency and termination-of-parental-rights causes,
the Rules provide that in these situations the interests of the
parent and child are deemed to conflict, and appointment of sep-
arate counsel is mandatory.7
Whenever the conflict is such that separate counsel is ap-
pointed, appointment of a guardian ad litem is mandatory. 7 It
is also required during the detention period prior to filing of
the petition where it appears that a neglect, dependency or ter-
mination-of-parental-rights cause will be brought before the
court, and also when the parents cannot be located or brought
before the court or when the child has no parent.78  In addi-
tion, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem whenever in
its discretion it "deems appointment ... to be in the best
74. The variety of custom noted earlier, in the discussion at
notes 38-54 supra, is also present in the use of public defenders in thejuvenile courts. Some counties employ no public defenders in juvenile
court. Others have as many as two public defenders in addition to
frequent assistance from outside counsel. The Hennepin County Legal
Aid Society employed four full time attorneys for juvenile court work
until Dec. 1, 1969 when this responsibility was shifted to the Public
Defender's Office.
75. MJCR 2-1(4).
76. MJCR 2-1(5). A similar provision is found in CALw. WEL. &
INST'NS CODE § 634 (West Supp. 1968).
77. MJCR 9-1.
78. MJCR 9-1.
1969]
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interests of the child."79  As in the appointment of separate
counsel, this places a responsibility upon the court to inquire into
the relationship between parent and child prior to proceeding on
the merits.
In determining whether the requisite indifference or hostil-
ity of the parent exists, the court is confronted with a dilemma
when notice of the juvenile proceeding cannot be effected upon
the parent. Since the parent has not clearly failed in his duties,
the court has little guidance in determining whether to make
an appointment. If a parent is extremely difficult to reach, the
court is best advised not to delay the proceedings, but rather
to deem the absence a display of indifference.
An additional problem is whether the guardian ad litem
may act on behalf of the parent without prejudicing the parent's
rights such as notice and waiver. The Rules state that the
guardian ad litem is to be considered as the parent for purposes
of the juvenile proceeding.80 Traditionally, guardians ad litem
have been viewed as acting on behal:E of the child8l and therefore
responsible for ensuring that the child's rights are considered by
the court.8 2 In fact, case law clearly states that they are not
permitted to waive any right of the child unless it is not of such
substance as to affect the proceeding.83 Thus, if the right of the
parent to receive notice is considered to be intimately related to
the child's rights, it is arguable that the child could object or
appeal on the grounds of failure to give notice to his parent. The
Rules are apparently designed to avoid this problem by viewing
the guardian ad litem, once appointed, as the child's parent and
as having the rights thereof. Even under this interpretation,
however, a person may be reluctant to be appointed since his
appearance must necessarily be construed as cutting off the
79. MJCR 9-1.
80. MJCR 9-3.
81. The guardian ad litem is considered to be an officer of the
court, Garner v. I.E. Schilling Co., 128 Fla. 353, 174 So. 837 (1937); Cole
v. Superior Ct. of San Francisco, 63 Cal. 86 (1883); Bryant v. Livermore,
20 Minn. 313 (Gil. 271) (1874); who is charged with protecting the in-
terests of the infant, Cozine v. Bonnick, 245 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. 1952);
Ebbert v. Westfall, 123 W. Va. 690, 17 S.E.2d 787 (1941).
82. Stunz v. Stunz, 131 I. 210, 23 N.E. 407 (1890); Long v. Mul-
ford, 17 Ohio St. 485 (1867).
83. Ostman v. Kane, 389 Ill. 613, 60 N.E.2d 93 (1945); In re Hills,
264 N.Y. 349, 191 N.E. 12 (1934). Minnesota case law follows the general
development noted in notes 81 & 82 supra. While the Minnesota Su-
preme Court has said that the guardian ad litem cannot waive any of
the minor's rights, Eidan v. Finnegan, 48 Minn. 53, 50 N.W. 933 (1892),
no recent statement has been made by the court on this issue.
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parent's right to notice and other rights in connection with the
proceeding. Nonetheless, in changing the duties and responsi-
bilities of the guardian ad litem, the Rules provide the juvenile
court with a useful device to proceed without unnecessary delay
in all juvenile causes where a parent is absent.
4. Dispositional Hearing
In addition to the increased participation of counsel at the
adjudicatory hearing, the Rules provide that at the dispositional
hearing, counsel may scrutinize the reports 4 and recommenda-
tions of probation officers and cross-examine the officer who
prepared the report.8 5 Since Minnesota, unlike most other
states, has previously permitted counsel to participate at dis-
position, it is arguable that the right to inspection of these re-
ports under the Rules will have no significant impact. It is ex-
pected, however, that the expanded rights at disposition under
the Rules will encourage more frequent appearance of counsel
at disposition.
5. Role of Counsel
Even though the "treatment" following an adjudication of
delinquency may be as severe as a criminal penalty, the defense
counsel in juvenile court has not held the important position
enjoyed by his counterpart in the criminal court.8 6 In view
of the rights afforded juveniles under the Rules, the provisions
outlining the right to counsel are the most important since they
offer the most potential for change in the traditional setting of
the juvenile proceeding. The extent of such change in the juve-
nile court will be determined not only by the frequency with
which counsel appears in juvenile court but more importantly,
by the manner in which he represents his client.
The frequency of defense counsel appearance prior to the
Rules ranged from nearly every case in a few counties to one out
of ten in others.8 7 The impetus for increased appearance of coun-
84. See text accompanying notes 130-32 infra.
85. MJCR 2-3(1) (c), 10-5(1).
86. Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
87. In Dakota County, counsel is appointed in almost every case,
whereas in Scott County it has been estimated that counsel appears,
appointed or otherwise, in only 10 percent of the cases. On the basis
of these practices it is tempting to conclude that due process is being
denied where counsel is not appearing on a fairly frequent basis. How-
ever, many other factors must be considered. For example, the infre-
quent appearance of counsel in small counties may stem from a wide-
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sel can be expected to come from the court itself as well as from
those juveniles brought before it. If the current proposals to
provide for direct review of probate-juvenile court decisions 88
are successful, and if verbatim records of juvenile proceedings
are made as required, 9 judges who have proceeded in the ab-
sence of counsel in the past will probably be more reluctant to
permit waiver of counsel. Similarly, as the juvenile court
evolves from an agency for juveniles with an informal hearing to
a traditional court with accompanying formal procedure, more
juveniles may feel the need for counsel and therefore request it.oo
Based upon the experience of other states where counsel has more
freely been made available to juveniles, it appears quite certain
that representation in Minnesota will increase.9 1 Judges and
attorneys alike agree with this conclusion but are reluctant to
hazard an estimate as to the form that representation will take
under the Rules.
While the Rules make clear when counsel may participate
in juvenile proceedings, neither the :Rules nor Gault provide any
guidelines as to the manner in which counsel should partici-
pate.92 Many writers have argued that because of the "special
situation" of the juvenile as the subject of state care and treat-
ment, the role of the lawyer in the juvenile court properly differs
from that in criminal court.93 If the juvenile proceeding is in
spread feeling that the probate-juvenile judge is "doing a good job" and
therefore the determination of juvenile cases should be left solely to hisjudgment. In such cases parents may not feel the need for counsel.
Another factor to be considered is the manner in which counsel is ten-
dered to the parties. If it is not done in a positive manner and made
readily available, the desire to "get it over with" will often prevail.
For further comment on this subject, see Paulsen, supra note 61, at
528 et seq.
88. See text accompanying note 144 infra.
89. See MJCR 1-3.
90. The increase in formality and decrease of informal discussion
of the juvenile's "problem" is likely to bring with it a complexity that
may make a party uncertain of his rights in the absence of counsel.
Operating against this is the traditional feeling of the parent to "get
it over with."
91. See Platt & Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational
Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1156, 1163-84 (1968).
92. It is commonly recognized that most lawyers have little if
any expertise in handling juvenile cases. Paulsen, supra note 61, at
528-29; McKesson, Right to Counsel in Juvenile Proceedings, 45 M=.
L. RBv. 843, 846 (1961).
93. Judge Ketcham has defined the juvenile lawyer's role in the
following terms:
1) To advocate and defend proper legal rights.
2) To be a legal guardian with special concern for his client's wel-
fare and best interests.
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fact a "special situation," the lawyer is faced with the problem
of deciding what kind of representation to give the juvenile in
the delinquency hearing-either to assume the role of a vigor-
ous advocate and endeavor to secure the lightest "penalty" for
his client, or to assist the court in its attempt to rehabilitate the
child. Lawyers are likely to be as divided as writers on this
subject.9 4
It might be contended that where the juvenile has admitted
guilt to the attorney, representation should be directed towards
achieving an effective means of rehabilitation at the dispositional
hearing, rather than vigorous pursuit of all the procedural rights
provided by the Rules. This position necessarily assumes that
counsel has a responsibility to help treat the child which out-
weighs the duty to press for all the rights available to his client.
The danger is that the attorney has in effect assumed the role of
judge in the case, and thus deprived the juvenile of his procedural
safeguards. In view of the tendency of children to confess 95 and
the unreliability of their statements, a greater danger is that the
child may be induced by the attorney into a confession he might
not otherwise have made and which may be totally untrue. In
such a situation the attorney who is seeking to help the child
has effectively prevented the child from receiving the vigorous
defense contemplated by the Rules.
Because of the failure of the parens patriae doctrine as noted
in Gault9 and the punitive nature of the "treatment" juveniles
may receive after adjudication, advocates in the traditional sense
are necessary to protect the rights provided by the Rules.97 In-
deed, the Rules Committee contemplated no restriction on the
3) To act as an officer of the court with a concern for the admin-
istration of justice.
Ketcham, supra note 68, at 591. It has also been contended that while
his role may not differ greatly at the adjudicatory hearing, the lawyer
"can and should adopt a role different from his role in a criminal
court" when he appears at the dispositional hearing. Note, Juvenile De-
linquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 775, 798-99 (1966).
94. The dilemma which faces the attorney "is the extent to
which such role enlargement should temper the lawyer's traditional
duty to help secure the lightest possible penalty or sanctions for his
client's wrongdoing." Lefstein, In 'e Gault, Juvenile Courts and Law-
yers, 53 A.B.A.J. 811, 812-13 (1967). See Skoler, supra note 68, for an
argument that the past failures of the juvenile court justify vigorous
defense by counsel. For a discussion of the possible harm of a "crimi-
nal mouthpiece" in juvenile court, see Paulsen, supra note 68, at 569.
95. See note 116 infra.
96. 387 U.S. at 26-27.
97. See Skoler, supra note 68, at 580.
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traditional advocate's role,98 though such restrictions have been
recommended by others. 9
The Rules also recast the role of the county attorney and
juvenile judge. Since the county attorney must present the
state's evidence at the adjudicatory hearing, °0  the juvenile judge
is effectively placed in his traditional courtroom role. Any prob-
lem of the judge being both prosecutor and trier of fact, such
as has arisen in other states,01 is avoided. Accordingly, juvenile
proceedings can be expected to depart from the informal manner
which has characterized past procedure, take on a more adver-
sary nature'0 2 and unavoidably become more like the adult crim-
inal trial.
The shift to a more truly adversary proceeding in juvenile
court may lead to an occasional dismdssal on procedural grounds.
It has been argued that the vigorous counsel who presses pro-
cedural points in the juvenile court destroys the setting and ef-
fect of the juvenile court as an instrumentality for providing
help and guidance to the child. The argument continues that
dismissals on technical points may defeat the purpose of the
juvenile court in individual cases by "letting the child off."1 03
But whether the child is "let off" actually depends on the will-
ingness of the county attorney to present a strong case consistent
with the Rules, and on how well police officers recognize the
child's rights when taking a child into custody. While the argu-
ment is equally applicable to the criminal court, it is commonly
rebutted there by concern for due process which has come to
be recognized as of primary importance. The same concern for
due process must be present for juveniles, and fears of "letting
the child off" should be regarded as no more than a vestige of the
discredited philosophy of parens patrilae.
6. Other Effects of Counsel
In addition to the potential development of more procedural
issues, the increased activity of counsel is likely to lead to in-
creased appellate review. This possibility and the more frequent
appearance of counsel will no doubt influence the juvenile judge
98. Interview, supra note 38.
99. E.g., Paulsen, supra note 61, at 586-37.
100. MJCR 5-2(1).
101. Note, supra note 93, at 795-96.
102. See Ketcham, supra note 68, at 596.
103. Such a result has been criticized but accepted as an unavoid-
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to be more alert to the requirements of the Rules and due proc-
ess.
Of course, the greater demand for defense counsel will result
in added expense to the county where the parties cannot afford
an attorney. This could create a problem where a county is
reluctant to provide more money for juvenile defenders. More-
over, it has been estimated that a substantial increase in costs
for preparation of the case will result since the county attorney
is required to draw all petitions. 0 4 Furthermore, juvenile
judges may insist that the county attorney appear at all phases
of the proceeding. Thus, if strict compliance with the Rules is
achieved, the cost increase to the county could be significant
despite the current small caseload.
C. RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMVINATION
The privilege against self-incrimination has not always been
extended to children in juvenile court.105  It was argued that
since the court was participating in the "treatment" of the child,
it should encourage the child to admit his transgression as the
first step in his rehabilitation. Gault held to the contrary; the
"constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable
in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults.' 0 6
The right to remain silent in an adjudicatory hearing is pro-
vided by the Rules not only to a child who is the subject of a
delinquency cause, but to a child in a traffic offender cause as
well. 10 7 No mention of this right is made in regard to other
types of juvenile proceedings. This right is to be distinguished
from the traditional privilege against self-incrimination, which
is not specifically articulated in the Rules but is subsumed by
them.
The right to remain silent arises at the moment the child is
taken into custody and continues until adjudication. 0 8 It spe-
cifically includes the right of the child to be interrogated only
in the presence of at least one of his parents. 0 9 The Rules
explicitly adopt the four point warning set down in Miranda v.
able consequence of participation of counsel to protect the child's rights.
Paulsen, supra note 61, at 539.
104. Interview, supra note 52.
105. E.g., People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
106. 387 U.S. at 55.
107. MJCR 2-2(1).
108. MJCR 2-2(1).
109. M.JCR 2-2 (1).
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Arizona"0 as the proper form for notice of this right."' In addi-
tion, the child has the right to be warned of his right to remain
silent, in the presence of at least one of his parents."
2
The Miranda warning has previously been used by many
counties, and the Rules are not the first to require that this
warning be given to both parent and child." 3  The require-
ment that the warning be given to the child and parent in each
other's presence, however, has been criticized as "unduly compli-
cating" the pre-adjudicatory phase." 4 While it may be burden-
some from the standpoint of time delays and possible extension
of the child's detention, this requirement is probably necessary to
make the provision on waiver of rights meaningful. Juveniles
have been observed to confess readily when made the subject of a
juvenile cause." 5 A juvenile is also more likely than an adult
to confess in the presence of the police officer who takes him into
custody."( Thus, a juvenile requires special handling" 7 and
peculiar safeguards to ensure that his right to remain silent is
not violated in the apprehension process." 8
The Rules give additional protection to the child when his
admission is obtained in conformance to the Rules. While
admissible at the adjudicatory heaiing, these statements must
be corroborated to sustain an adjudication in a delinquency or
traffic offender cause." 9 In view of the child's tendency to con-
fess, 20 and the possible unreliability of his statements, this rule
is an important safeguard for the juvenile.
A perplexing problem arises with regard to how pre-custody
statements made by the child should be handled. Miranda ap-
plies only to the custodial phase of the investigation and there-
110. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
111. MJCR 2-2(1).
112. MJCR 2-2(1).
113. Such a requirement was set forth in Matter of William L., 29
App. Div. 2d 182, 287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1968).
114. Comment, Juvenile Law-Due Process Requires Child's Parent
Be Given Miranda Warning-Matter of William, L., 32 ALB. L. REV. 667,
671 (1968).
115. See Note, supra note 93, at 794.
116. Comment, Juvenile Offender and Self-Incrimination, 40 WAsH.
L. REV. 189 (1965).
117. Paulsen, supra note 68, at 551.
118. In connection with the problem of juvenile waiver, it has been
argued that "something more than ... Miranda" is required in view of
the child's disadvantage vis-h-vis the police officer. Note, Waiver in the
Juvenile Court, 68 COLUm. L. REV. 1149, 1164 (1968).
119. MJCR 5-3(1).
120. See note 116 supra.
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fore does not offer any solution. Since the Rules adopted the
Miranda warning language, it is arguable that the right to re-
main silent is limited to custodial interrogation. While consistent
with the language of the Rules, this interpretation does not follow
their spirit. The Rules should be no less protective than require-
ments presently placed upon police in investigating criminal ac-
tivity. Thus, the child must at least be afforded the right to
remain silent when the pre-custody investigation has begun to
"focus on a particular suspect."'12 It might seem that due to the
child's disposition toward making false confessions, the child
should have an absolute right to remain silent in all instances.
Such a restriction on police beyond present criminal require-
ments, however, would be a substantial, if not debilitating, hin-
drance on the performance of their duty. Nevertheless, any
admissions obtained at this stage are properly subject to the
requirement for corroboration to sustain an adjudication of de-
linquency.
While the Rules expressly extend the right to counsel to
both the child and the parent, the same is not true of the right
to remain silent. 22 Thus, a child's parents might be called
upon to give testimony which could provide the grounds for a
neglect or termination-of-parental-rights proceeding. The privi-
lege against self-incrimination would normally be available to
the parents upon taking the stand. Nevertheless, it is indeed
possible that such privilege could not be invoked in juvenile
court since all juvenile proceedings are considered to be civil
rather than criminal. Also, while the child still has the privilege
against self-incrimination during the dispositional hearing, his
right to remain silent ceases upon an adjudication of delin-
quency.123 Presumably he could not withhold information after
adjudication which might lead to a neglect or termination-of-
parental-rights proceeding.
The right to remain silent, if strictly protected, will probably
have a substantial impact on present police procedure in han-
dling juveniles after they have been taken into custody. The
Rules may well result in a reversal of the present situation in
which the overwhelming majority of juveniles appearing in court
have admitted their guilt,2 4 and, in turn, the state will need to
121. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
122. The Rules clearly state that this right is made available to the
child alone. MJCR 2-2(1).
123. MJCR 2-2(1).
124. Paulsen, Juvenile Courts and the Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J.
527, 543 (1968).
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present a much stronger case than is the current practice if it is
to secure an adjudication of delinquency. In large measure, the
extent of the impact of the right to remain silent will depend
upon the vigor with which it is asserted by defense counsel.
D. RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAmINATION
The right to confrontation and cross-examination during the
delinquency hearing is provided in the Mlinnesota Juvenile Court
Act; 25 the Rules follow this statutory provision. 26 The Rules
facilitate the cross-examination of witnesses by providing for
the right to enter evidence 27 and the right to have the court
issue subpoenas.128 This will be done at county expense if the
party is unable to pay. 29 Of particular importance is the right
to cross-examine the person who prepared any report for the
use of the court, after it has been filed and entered into evi-
dence. 30 With one exception, 31 these reports are not admissible
at the adjudicatory hearing, but they are admissible at the dis-
positional hearing, 32 and it is at that point that the right to
cross-examine the preparer of the rep ort arises.
In addition to the right to cross-examine the report's author
-normally a probation officer-the parties may inspect any
report prior to its admission into evidence.' 33 This right is
125. MAnaN. STAT. § 260.155(6) (1967) provides:
The minor and his parent, guardian, or custodian are entitled to
be heard, to present evidence material to the case, and to cross-
examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.
126. MJCR 2-3 (1) (b).
127. MJCR 2-3 (1) (a).
128. MJCR 2-3(1) (f).
129. MJCR 2-3(1) (f).
130. MJCR 2-3(1) (c), 10-5(1). The reports set forth in the rules
are as follows: MJCR 10-1 (social study); MJCR 10-2 (medical exami-
nation); MJCR 10-3 (traffic offense s;udy); MJCR 10-4 (reference
study). While the Rules do not address themselves to the problem of
later hearings on modification of the disposition, it would appear that
such a hearing ought to be regarded as being in the nature of a disposi-
tional hearing and thus the right to cross-examination should be made
available to the parties.
131. The reference study is admissible at a hearing on reference
for prosecution in a delinquency or traffic offender cause and at
the adjudicatory hearing in neglect, dependency or termination-of-pa-
rental-rights causes. MJCR 10-4 (3).
132. MJCR 10-1(3), 10-2(3), 10-3(3).
133. MJCR 2-3 (1) (c). MXNN. STAT. § 260.161(2) (1967) permits
inspection by counsel of "any report or social history furnished to the
court ... ." No provision is made for cross-examination of the preparer
of such a report nor has such a practice been followed by the courts.
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specifically extended to counsel,3 4 and when not represented
by counsel, the party has a right to inspect the report for him-
self.135 Where the court feels, however, that it is not in the best
interest of the child for him to see the report, counsel will be
appointed for that purpose. 6 I
These provisions represent a significant change from past
practice where reports were seldom admitted into evidence at
the dispositional hearing. 37 Even when admitted, neither exam-
ination of the reports by counsel nor cross-examination of the
preparer of the report has been a regular procedure. Both the
report, once admitted, and any cross-examination of the officer
will be made part of the hearing record. Recommendations on
disposition made in the report will be open to direct attack and
possible appellate review. As a result, the reports prepared by
officers are likely to be more carefully drawn and recommenda-
tions as to disposition are likely to be based on specific ob-
servable data rather than merely on opinion of the probation
officer. 38
E. TRANSCRIPT OF REcoRD AND APPELLATE REVmw
Neither the right to a transcript of the proceeding nor the
right to appeal a juvenile decision was passed on in Gault.8 9 In
Minnesota the Juvenile Court Act provides for the juvenile's
right to appeal' 40 and the Rules have now granted the right to a
transcript of any proceeding. 14' Accompanying these rights is
the requirement that a verbatim record be made in all juvenile
court hearings, except in traffic offender causes unless the child
or parent request that such a record be made.142
134. It should be noted that by the language of MJCR 10-5 (1) the
right to inspection is granted to the parties by their counsel. This ap-
pears to conflict with MJCR 2-3(1) (c) which grants this right to
parties. It would seem that MJCR 10-5 (1) should be viewed as the gov-
erning rule since the discussion in MJCR 2-3 (1) (c) appears to be noth-
ing more than a passing reference to the right of inspection.
135. MJCR 10-5(1).
136. MJCR 10-5(1).
137. No statutory requirement exists under the Juvenile Court Act
for admission into evidence of these reports nor have they been made
a part of the record in past practice.
138. While the past role of the probation officer may be limited by
the provisions on inspection of reports and cross-examination of the pre-
parer, the probation officer may continue to present state's evidence at
the dispositional hearing. MJCR 6-4(1).
139. 387 U.S. at 8.
140. MrxNN. STAT. § 260.191 (1967). See also MJCR 2-3(1) (e).
141. MJCR 2-3(1) (d).
142. MJCR 1-3(1).
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The value of the probate-juvenile court record for purposes
of appeal is questionable since the Juvenile Court Act provides
that appeal from probate-juvenile courts is to be taken to the
district court de novo.143 A proposed amendment would, how-
ever, establish direct appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court in
all cases except traffic offenses.144 If direct appeal is eventually
authorized, these requirements may instill in judges a greater
alertness for the rights of the child and the requirements of due
process. Furthermore, the possibility that the proceedings may
be challenged under the critical eye of the supreme court will
no doubt aid in achieving greater procedural uniformity in the
juvenile courts.
F. NOTICE OF BASIc RIGHTS
To insure protection of the child's basic rights, the Rules
provide the child with timely and effective notice of his rights.
In all cases the Rules require that the form of the notice match
the language in which the right is granted. 45 For example, since
the Rules incorporate the Miranda warning 46 in the right to re-
main silent, the notice must be equally specific.
The Rules leave no doubt as to who must give the notice and
at what point it must be given. The requirement of notice arises
at the moment the child is taken into custody,'147 and must be
included in the summons or notice to appear, 48 at any prelim-
inary hearing and at each stage of the formal proceedings. 49
The judge must not only notify all parties of their rights at the
beginning of any hearing but, where demanded by the Rules, he
must ascertain whether previous notice has been given.1 0 The
Rules attempt to prevent circumvention by the judge on require-
ments of time, form and frequency of notice.' 51 If strictly ad-
143. MIN. STAT. § 260.291(2) (1967).
144. Such a proposal was introduced in the 1969 session of the Min-
nesota Legislature. Although it received substantial backing from the
judiciary, it was rejected.
145. E.g., MJCR 2-3(2).
146. See text accompanying note 111 supra.
147. MJCR 7-1(2).
148. MJCR 4-2(d).
149. E.g., MJCR 5-1. This requirement applies to the reference,
adjudicatory and dispositional hearings.
150. MJCR 5-1(c) (adjudicatory hearing); MJCR 6-3 (dispositional
hearing).
151. Such an attempt to skirt notice requirements is further re-
stricted by the mandatory forms adopted to complement the Rules.
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hered to, they will guarantee that adequate and timely notice
is given in the majority of cases.
G. Ti PROBLEM OF WAIVER
Under the Rules all basic rights are waivable with the sole
exception of the right to counsel at a reference hearing when
the alleged violation of law would constitute a felony if com-
mitted by an adult.15 2  The commonly accepted definition of
waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.""53 The United States Supreme Court
has held that any waiver must be "intelligently and understand-
ingly" exercised to be effective. 54 Since the child's legal capac-
ity at common law was viewed as something less than that of
an adult, 5'5 it has been asserted that the child in a juvenile
proceeding is not likely to meet the standards for effective
waiver. 5 6
The Rules, however, clearly articulate the requirements for
a valid waiver by a juvenile which effectively prevent the juve-
nile from waiving for himself. If the child is under 14 years of
age, he plays no part in the decision to waive.1 57 If he is 14 or
older, he may waive his rights subject to ratification by his par-
ent.' 5 Thus, in the case of the older child, waiver cannot be
accomplished unless both parent and child participate. A recent
152. MJCR 1-5 (1). The right to nondisclosure of sealed records
under MJCR 11-3 is also not waivable. Notice that no reference is
made to this nonwaivability under rule 1-5 (1). It seems apparent that
rule 1-5(1) purports to deal only with basic rights and that sealing of
records is not included within that category. Since there is no conflict
between these two rules the provision on sealing of records should be
given no less weight than basic rights on the matter of waiver. Cf. Note,
Sealing of Juvenile Court Records, 54 MmvmN. L. REV. 433 (1969).
It should be noted that if a party wishes to exercise his right to
inspect records under rule 10-5 and if the court feels it is not in the
best interests of the child for him to see these reports, such right can
only be exercised if the child is represented by counsel. This raises the
question of whether counsel should ever be permitted to be waived.
153. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See also Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
154. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1957).
155. For the best recent discussion on this problem, see Note,
supra note 118.
156. Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91 (1944); Note, supra note 118, at
1158; Note, Waiver of Constitutional Rights by Minors: A Question of
Law or Fact?, 19 HAsT. L.J. 223, 225 (1967).
157. MJCR 1-5(3) (a).
158. MJCR 1-5(3) (b).
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case in New York sets forth a similar judicial requirement for
effective waiver.'50
Bringing the parent into the waiver decision creates the
problem, as in the case of right to counsel, 10 of determining
when the parent is hostile or indifferent to the interests of the
child. Since the Rules in both instances contemplate a great
deal of participation by the parent, the determination becomes
doubly important. One commentator has suggested that when-
ever a parent has the right to waive a child's right and does in
fact waive that right, the court should immediately halt the
proceedings and examine the parent-child relationship. 16  To
deal with the problem, the Rules should provide for an initial de-
termination by the court on the wisdom of allowing the parent
to act in the child's behalf. Such a provision would insure
that the parent participates in the interest of the child and that
any waiver by him is "intelligent and knowledgeable." Since
the Rules seek to install the parent as a companion to the attor-
ney in protecting the juvenile's rights, it would be quite appro-
priate to examine his parental responsibility prior to permitting
him to exercise waiver for the child.
The waiver provision is likely 1o encourage the exercise of
rights which have been routinely waived in the past, especially
when an attorney is appointed guardian ad litem.162 It is diffi-
cult to see how the formal notice of rights in positive terms and
the confrontation of the juvenile and his parents with the deci-
sion of waiver can have any other effect. In so providing, the
Rules push "informal" juvenile hearings into the annals of the
past and help to establish the juvenile court as a court in the
traditional sense.
H. Tim PROBLEM OF UNIFoRMITY
The Rules are available for adoption by the district-juvenile
courts in the two so-called "metropolitan counties" in Minne-
sota.163 Presently, there is no indication that the procedure
in these counties will soon approximate that of the Rules. Since
159. Matter of William L., 29 App. Div. 2d 183, 287 N.Y.S.2d 218(1968).
160. See text accompanying notes 75 & 76 supra.
161. Note, supra note 118, at 1158.
162. Under the Rules the guardian ad litem is required to be an
attorney except where a certain layman would be more appropriate (e.g.,
an adult relative who has demonstrated interest and concern for the
child's welfare).
163. MJCR Foreword, 1-2 (d).
[Vol. 54:335
JUVENILE COURT RULES
over 50 percent of all juvenile causes in the state are heard in
these counties alone,164 the Rules will fail to provide for the
uniformity of procedure which they seek to achieve until these
counties act to adopt the Rules.
Hennepin County, comprised mainly of Minneapolis and its
environs, has drafted its own proposed set of rules.16 5 These
rules were drawn independently of the Rules and thus do not
follow their format. In regard to providing basic rights, the pro-
posed Hennepin County rules differ from the Rules in two
serious respects. First, the proposed Hennepin County rules do
not require that a statement of facts in support of a delinquency
cause accompany the notice of charges in the petition; rather
they explicitly forbid a statement alleging delinquency. 66 The
nature of the cause and the facts are to be determined at the
initial hearing and only then will they be specified. 16 7 Whether
such provisions allow adequate notice as required by Gault is
indeed questionable.
The second major difference in the proposed Hennepin
County rules is the provision which allows waiver of rights.16 8
A child over 17 may waive if he has knowledge of his rights and
the consequences of waiver. A child 17 or under is presumed to
be incapable of exercising waiver. In contrast to this, the probate-
juvenile court rules provide that no child can waive his rights
without waiver by his parent. 69 Furthermore, where waiver is
required by someone other than the child under the proposed
Hennepin County rules, such person need not be the child's
parent as required under the probate-juvenile court rules. He
need only be an adult who meets the traditional test of capacity
for waiver and who has a "demonstrable concern" for the child's
welfare. 70 Thus, next of kin are in a position to waive the
rights of the child. While this provision eliminates the time
consuming determination of whether a conflict of interest exists,
it places a heavy responsibility on the judge to make certain that
the requisite "demonstrable concern" is present. Since a parent
without such "demonstrable concern" is not suited to waive the
child's rights, the proposed Hennepin County rules may be a
164. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
165. PRoosSED JUVENILE COURT RULEs FOR HENNEPiN COUNTY(Draft No. 2, Dec. 31, 1968) [hereinafter cited as HENNEimN].
166. HIENNinT 31.02.
167. IIENN~ni 42.03.
168. HIENNEin 15.01.
169. See text accompanying notes 157 & 158 supra.
170. HIENxEp 15.02.
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more satisfactory approach than the probate-juvenile court rules
in this regard. 17'
IV. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules are the most compre-
hensive statement on the basic rights of juveniles set forth by
any state to date. With the exception of the right to bail and
right to jury, they extend the traditional safeguards of the crim-
inal court to the accused child in juvenile court. If the Rules
are followed, juvenile proceedings in Minnesota can be expected
to change dramatically. Juvenile court hearings will become
more formal and counsel will appear more frequently. This in
turn will lead to fewer confessions and more contested cases.
An increase in the amount of time and money spent on
juvenile cases and in the cost of such proceedings can also be
expected. This would be felt most severely in the metropolitan
areas if their courts were to adopt the Rules. In light of these
probable developments, it seems likely that the degree of com-
pliance and the impact of the Rules will ultimately depend in
greatest measure upon counsel and the role he assumes in the
juvenile court. The Rules may also bring a drastic change in
the role of the probation officer in making him subject to cross-
examinations on any reports he has prepared for the court. The
Rules continue to provide for the appointment of refereesY.7
2
The heavy caseload and limited number of personnel and facili-
ties in the metropolitan areas probably demands the continuance
of this practice for the present. It may, however, convincingly
be argued that such a function is not consistent with the spirit
and intent of the Rules which seek to establish the juvenile court
as a traditional court of law.
Gault was not intended to transform the juvenile court into
a criminal court. 78 Yet it is undeniable that many if not most
of the characteristics of the criminal court may appear in juve-
nile courts under the Rules. Such a prospect need not be viewed
as contrary to the purpose of the juvenile court. Indeed, it
may fairly be argued that far from being antagonistic to the
171. Ramsey County (St. Paul) has not moved to adopt the MJCR or
draft their own set of rules. St. Louis County (Duluth) is now under the
Rules. Note 27 supra. It is possible that Ramsey County may follow the
lead of Hennepin County.
172. MJCR 1-6.
173. Douglas, Juvenile Courts and Due Process of Law, 19 Juv. CT.
JuDaES J. 9 (Spring 1968).
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traditional juvenile court goal of rehabilitation, formal guar-
antees of basic rights encourage rehabilitation by impressing
upon the child the fact that he has not been subject to a
kangaroo court. More importantly, such guarantees are a long
step toward the no less vital goal of justice for the child.
